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Aibel: Aibel: Corporate Counsel and Business Ethics

Corporate Counsel and Business Ethics:
A Personal Review
H. J. Aibel"
It was over 35 years ago that I left the private practice of law to join a
corporate law department. Corporate law departments existed prior to World
War II, but primarily at railroad and other utility companies subject to
extensive regulation or which had repetitive claims. It was only in the decades
after the war that law departments grew in number, size, and importance.
Probably the GE legal operation was the first of the "full service" departments. When I joined GE in 1957 there were 120 lawyers, most of whom
were at decentralized management locations, but all professionally responsible
to the GE general counsel; that was more lawyers than were at all but a
handful of the large New York Wall Street firms. At the time that I was
looking for my first job as a lawyer, it was rare that any law school
placement office would provide assistance to those few companies which,
according to an ABA study published in 1952, employed recent law graduates

right out of school. It was not suggested to any of the better students, at least
it was not at my law school, that they consider joining a corporate law
department.
It was then the generally accepted wisdom that jobs in corporate law
departments were for second raters, or lawyers who had failed to make
partner at some of the better firms. It was asserted that the work done in
corporate law departments, often actually the corporate secretary's department, was not truly professional, with the employed lawyers acting merely
as conduits to outside counsel.
I personally felt that to join a corporate law department was to risk
giving up the opportunity to be an independent force in the community, and
possibly beyond, since there would be pressure, I thought, to conform to the
corporate position on public issues. Thus in 1955, when I was in my fourth
year of practice, I turned down an offer of employment from a major
corporation on that ground, somewhat to the amazement of the general
counsel. Shaking his head in disbelief, he said that he thought that even as
a partner of a major firm, a lawyer might be constrained not to take public
positions to which clients of the firm could take exception, and indeed I found
out subsequently that he was right.

* Earl F. Nelson Lecture. University of Missouri-Columbia School of
Law, Friday, November 5, 1993.
** Executive Vice President and Chief Legal Officer, ITT Corporation.
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Over the course of the years, professional responsibilities of corporate
counsel have changed and developed to the point that they have become an
integral part of the management structure. Success in becoming a member
of the management "team" depends in most instances on the development of
mutual trust and confidence between corporate counsel and the executives and
managers who run the corporation. The lawyer thinks of those individuals
as the clients, and those executives and managers think of the corporate
counsel as their lawyer. The career development of a corporate lawyer
depends to a major extent on success, not only in developing this relationship,
but also on the ability of the employed lawyer to make professional
contributions to the management's achievement of its business goals.
In fact, however, the corporate entity is the lawyer's client.' From time
to time divergences between the goals of the individuals and the best interests
of the corporation, as the lawyer sees the situation, can give rise to career
threatening tensions, if not ethical and legal issues. This is particularly the
case with regard to corporate programs to ensure compliance with legal,
regulatory, and ethical requirements.
It is these problems of practicing in a corporate law department that I
would like to discuss this afternoon. For me, these tensions and the ethical
and legal challenges of carrying out compliance functions became clear early
on in my career as a corporate lawyer.
It was a cold day in early February 1961 when William S. Ginn, who
until shortly before had been a corporate vice president of General Electric
Company with a very promising career, rose before Judge Ganey in a court
room in the Federal Court House in Philadelphia. Bill Ginn and three others,
two of them colleagues of his at GE, the other an executive of Westinghouse,
had pleaded guilty the previous December to one or more of 20 indictments
charging 21 electrical equipment manufacturers and a half dozen of their
executives with price fixing in violation of the antitrust laws. These were
the infamous electrical equipment cases, which later spawned private actions
to recover treble damages by over 4,000 utilities. Robert Kennedy, who had
only recently been confirmed as Attorney General, appeared in court to
excoriate the indicted individuals and their companies for their illegal price
gouging of the nation's electric utilities and the consumers they served. Fines
were imposed by Judge Ganey on the corporate defendants, and the
individuals were led away to serve time in jail, the first time in almost sixty
years of Sherman Act enforcement that executives charged with antitrust
violations had been sent to jail.
Just three years before, in January 1958, Judge Stanley Barnes, then of
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, who had served as the first head of the

1. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT 1.13 (1992) (Organization as
Client).
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Antitrust Division in the Eisenhower administration, gave a talk at the annual
dinner of the New York State Bar Associations's Antitrust Section. In the
course of his remarks, he said the following:
I am reminded of several large industrial empires which
within the last several years, have done a complete "about face"
in their attitude toward antitrust law and particularly toward the
government's efforts toward enforcement ....
I give as the number one example the General Electric
Company. It completely changed its policy since the war, and
undertook a strong compliance program, and a secondary
educational program to insure the success of its primary endeavor. This decision was made at a high level of management.
Prior to that time, General Electric had been named as a

defendant in at least 15 antitrust cases. Since 1952, General
Electric has had no suits brought against it by the government.
Of course, no one knows how long this state of affairs will last.
I hope that after mentioning the company by name, I will not
read of indictments in tomorrow morning's papers. 2
As I sat among the diners listening to Judge Barnes, I knew that grand juries
had only recently been empaneled in Philadelphia to hear testimony regarding
price fixing in the electrical equipment industry. The indictments did not
come "tomorrow," but they came soon enough.
The policy directive to which Judge Barnes referred was "On Compliance by the Company and its Employees with the Antitrust Laws. "3
This policy had been the subject of regular communication by members
of GE's senior management in New York and the field operating managers.
The Chief Executive had been quoted in the widely distributed minutes of a
management meeting: "failure to observe this Directive Policy.. .would result
in immediate replacement of the employee involved." Counseling compliance

2. "Isthere a Better Way?", in 1958 ANTrTRUST SYMPosIuM: HOW TO COMPLY
wrrH THE SHERMAN Acr, p. 115 et seq.
3. GE's policy 20.5 read in significant part:
"No employee shall enter into any understanding, agreement, plan or scheme, expressed or implied, formal or informal,
with any competitor, in regard to prices, terms or conditions of
sale, production, distribution, territories or customers; nor
exchange or discuss with a competitor prices, terms or conditions
of sale or any other competitive information; nor engage in any
other conduct which in the opinion of the Company's counsel
violates any of the anti-trust laws."
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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with the antitrust laws was the primary responsibility which GE lawyers had.
All to no avail.
Faced with highly credible evidence that senior operating executives of
the company had violated the policy, it was the determination of GE's senior
management that noncompliance would have to be met with internal
discipline. At that time I was on the headquarters staff of the General
Counsel serving as trade regulation counsel. I was given the assignment of
carrying out the compliance investigations. In carrying out my interrogations,
I told each person that I would keep confidential information disclosed to me
in the course of the interview, but that if I concluded that there had been
noncompliance with the policy, I would have to report that conclusion to the
senior management and that discipline could follow. I also told each target
of my investigation that while I had information implicating him, I would
accept his denial, but that should it be concluded at a later time that the denial
had been false, there would be an immediate discharge for cause. Following
each interview, and there were approximately forty, my conclusion as to
compliance with the Company policy was set forth in a summary memorandum which was the basis for the imposition of discipline upon the employee
when the conclusion was noncompliance. 4
As one of those who had been involved in price fixing activities put it
in the course of a compliance interview, there were a number of unwritten
rules which went along with participation in price fixing meetings: "One was
that you never talked to the lawyers about it, and two was that you never
talked about it with people in New York." I have often wondered whether
in fact some of the lawyers at the decentralized management locations, who
had developed particularly close relations with their management "clients",
had learned of the price fixing activities under circumstances which led them

to feel that it was their professional obligation to those who confided in them
not to betray the secrets and confidences which had been imparted to them.
I certainly felt no such professional obligation. However, the outside
lawyer retained by one highly placed GE manager who had been disciplined
following an interview with me wrote a strong letter to my superior, the
4. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485
(E.D. Pa. 1962). I would note that it was in the course of denying a claim of lawyerclient privilege by GE for these memoranda I had prepared that Judge Kirkpatrick, in
Westinghouse, one of the civil cases brought to recover treble damages, enunciated
the "control group" theory as a basis for determining the group whose communications with counsel would be protected from discovery. None of my interrogees,
including Mr. Ginn, save one executive vice president, was found by the Judge to be
a member of the "control group." The Supreme Court, in Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), disapproved the "control group" test, only about 25
years too late to do me or my client any good. Another instance confirming Justice
Holmes dictum that "Hard cases make bad law."
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/4
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General Counsel, arguing that the disciplinary action taken against his client
was based upon an unlawful and unethical disclosure by me of confidential
communications, that his client believed that I was acting at least in part as
his lawyer when he made his disclosures to me, and that, in the circumstances, his client's discipline should be reversed. It was also argued that his
client's being disciplined would become known to prosecutors and thus my
conduct had put his client in jeopardy, rendering him a target for indictment.
While I believed there was no basis to the claim that I had given the
impression that I was acting as the manager's counsel, these claims were very
troublesome to me, and caused me to do a great deal of soul searching as to
whether I had acted properly in handling my assignment.
The claims that I had acted wrongfully were not pursued after the
manager was named as a defendant in an indictment containing detailed
allegations of price fixing in the product line for which he was responsible,
and the issues raised by his lawyer as to my conduct were never resolved.
However, I knew that all of the individuals who had been disciplined were
resentful of my role and that their friends were wide spread throughout the
organization. I felt that my future career in the company could well be
adversely impacted by the hostile reaction of those who saw me as the engine
of destruction of their friends' careers. I realized that it might be very
difficult to establish effective working relations with many in management
whom I might in the future be called upon to advise, given this background.
My career at GE did progress. I was given responsibility for the civil
antitrust suits by the 4000 utilities that followed in the wake of the criminal
charges. However, I accepted an even more challenging offer to join ITT in
mid-1964; this feeling that my reputation among many of the operating
managers was that I was an informer was certainly a factor in my decision to
leave GE.
Lawyering involves both advocacy and counseling. The basic difference
is that as an advocate, a lawyer is stuck with the facts, whereas an advisor,
at least in the corporate setting, is in a position to shape policy and influence
the facts for the future. It is in this latter role, that of counselor, that an
inside lawyer has a great opportunity to contribute to the success of his or her
client and to our society as a whole. "Preventive practice" is the key phrase.
The most important element is the early involvement of the lawyer in
situations, transactions, or conduct that may have significant legal or ethical
consequences. As previously indicated, early involvement of the lawyer often
depends upon the prior establishment of a reputation for being a "team
player," a "can do lawyer," a lawyer who supports management.
Can a lawyer who works in a corporate setting maintain his or her
objectivity even when it is clear that the appropriate advice would be
unwelcome? Doing so requires self-confidence and inner strength. Does a
fear of adverse impact on a career in such situations lead an inside lawyer to
"get along by going along"? It depends upon the individual, of course, and
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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I would submit that the issue is no different for an inside lawyer than it is for
an outside lawyer with concerns over keeping a major client. But in the long
term we all know that a lawyer's reputation and career will be adversely
affected when a client gets in trouble because the lawyer didn't advise
properly. There is no reason to believe that an inside lawyer will be less
cognizant of such long term reputation and career considerations than would
an outside lawyer.
Although it is not easy for inside counsel to bring to the attention of the
corporation's Board of Directors situations in which senior management is
failing to take appropriate action, in the end, his or her career may depend
upon doing so. I have taken such action while at ITT; it wasn't an easy step
to take. However, after agonizing reflection it appeared to be the better
course for the long run. Some might say "you had better be sure you are
right," invoking the Machiavellian precept that when you go for the king you

must kill him or be killed. I was lucky and it all worked out, with neither the
king nor I having to be killed.
Consider however the fate of a recent General Counsel of Salomon
Brothers. According to a report by the SEC5 dealing in part with his
responsibility under the securities laws, his career at Salomon was brought to
a screeching halt by the Company's Board of Directors because he had not
informed the Board of senior management's failure to follow his advice that
remedial action be taken after it was learned that the firm's chief federal bond
trader had seriously violated trading rules.
My good friend Brian Forrow, for many years the General Counsel of
Allied Signal, has put the question of the independence of inside lawyers this
way:
"Is the hallmark of a lawyer-independent judgment
-blurred because the lawyer serves as inside counsel? Or is
inside counsel better able to bring independent judgment to a
corporation's problems, even perhaps to go beyond the law to
6
activate the corporate conscience?"
Let me give you a personal example of an inside lawyer's role in going
beyond the law to activate the corporate conscience.
Almost twenty years ago, in April of 1974, a letter from a former
Director of Contracts Administration of an important ITT Subsidiary was
received by the then Chief Executive of ITT. The writer alleged that he had

5. In the matter of John H. Gutfreund et al., Release No. 34-31554, 85,067 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,597 - 83,610 (Dec. 3, 1992).
6. Brian Forrow, The CorporateLawDepartmentLawyer: Counsel to the Entity,
34 Bus. LAW. 1797 (1979).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/4
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been wrongfully discharged because he had refused to go along with a plan
to make a relatively large payment to foreign government officials who had
been influential in the awarding of a large contract to the company. The
Chief Executive, disturbed by this allegation, referred the letter to me. He
asked that the situation be looked into and that he be advised as to what, if
anything, should be done.
After investigation, I determined that there was nothing to the ex-contract
administrator's allegations. The record of his poor performance, which was
the basis for discharge, was clear. I concluded that the story of foreign
bribery had been advanced in the hope that management concern that he had
information which, if made public, would be an embarrassment to the
Company, might lead to his reinstatement.
However, in the course of reviewing these charges, I learned that in
other instances covert arrangements had been made by some ITT managers

who operated abroad selling in export markets, to make payments to persons
not regularly engaged in the commercial activity of providing legitimate sales
representation. In fact, it was expected that most, if not all, of the payments
would be turned over to governmental officials in a position to direct or
influence the award of business.
My report to senior management of what I had learned provoked intense
discussions as to what to do in the circumstances. None of the senior
executives involved in the discussions had personal experience in markets
where the making of clandestine payments, bribes that is, was said to be a
customary practice. All were aware that often the explanation given by field
management for the loss of a major contract to a competitor was the close
relationship which that competitor had achieved with a high official of the
customer, an official who was in a position to influence the award. It was
part of the folklore of international marketing that such close relationships
frequently were achieved through clandestine corrupt payments. That's the
way the real world is, I was told.
Each of the senior executives affirmed that doing business in this way
was contrary to his own personal code of ethics, but the question was raised
as to whether there wasn't also a responsibility to the enterprise, its
stockholders, and employees not to lose business to competitors whose ethical
sensitivities could accommodate the payment of bribes. The general
acceptance of the use of such payments in aid of exports in foreign countries,
including the fact that governments of other exporting nations sanction such
payments, for instance, by financing them through export loans and by
allowing them to be deducted for tax purposes, was mentioned. Exports were
of great significance to many of ITT's foreign based companies, who needed
these orders to keep people employed. Why, it was asked of me, would I not
let sleeping dogs lie?
A quick survey of the laws of some of the developing countries that were
important markets disclosed that while each of them had laws prohibiting
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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bribes, these laws had never been enforced. The issue posed to me as
counsel was would it be right to impose rules based on the personal ethical
standards of the senior management, when doing so could have adverse
consequences for employees, creating hardship for many people? For me to
insist that conduct conform to the dead letter of laws honored in the breach
rather than by observance, simply because there was a law on the books,
could give rise, I thought, to a loss of effectiveness as an advisor. Please
remember that this situation arose in 1974, several years before the SEC
insisted upon disclosure of such payments and even longer before the passage
of the Foreign Corrupt Payments Act. Though clients would listen, they
might ignore advice which to them appeared to be academic, lacking in
realism.
But there were countervailing practical factors that I advanced to
reinforce the ethical and legal concerns. It was immediately clear that
whatever had been the experience in the past, attitudes toward such corruption
were changing, both in the United States and in developing countries. I
argued that inevitably disclosure of the use of bribes, or to use the euphemism

employed at the time, "questionable payments," was more probable than not.
Assuming that the facts came out, what could be expected? Among the
possible adverse consequences that I raised were the following:
Public disclosure through a leak or otherwise of improper payments
could give rise to significant risk of loss of corporate property in the
jurisdiction involved. Indeed, the physical safety of company personnel at the
contract site might be put in jeopardy. Certainly disclosure of such payments
could put at risk the completion of contracts in progress. Realistically the
opportunities to continue to do business in that country in the future would
not be too promising. Damage worldwide to a reputation for integrity and
ethical behavior could be a serious consequence.
Then there were the concerns about management control. How would
anyone know whether disbursements were really made for the asserted
purpose? Does some of the money stick to the fingers of the intermediary or,
worse yet, to the fingers of our own employees?
I suggested that management should be concerned that use of such
techniques for securing business could dull the competitive spirit. Is there a
need to provide appropriate values at competitive prices when business can
be secured through a payoff?. The question was, if we don't strive to be
competitively better today, what are the implications for our future?
Consideration had to be given, I argued, to the corrosive effect on
discipline in the organization, and of the adverse effect on the manager who
feels the expected, but unjustified promotion must be provided, or who
hesitates to fire, a nonperforming employee because of concern that he will
disclose information about clandestinely made questionable payments.
Even more serious was the clear risk of falling into the hands of

blackmailers; for instance, disgruntled ex-employees who claim they will
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/4
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make embarrassing disclosures unless a substantial payment or other benefit
is forthcoming. This certainly appeared to be the situation in the case of the
letter writing ex-contract administrator I told you about a few minutes ago.
At the end of the day, senior management decided that it would issue a
policy statement forbidding the making of such corrupt payments to influence

the award of business, directly or indirectly, and other unethical conduct. In
addition, a compliance function was established in the legal department with
responsibility for providing advice regarding compliance to managers at all
levels, for investigating indications of policy violations and advising senior
management as to remedial action to be taken, if any.
Inside counsel in ITT had and has a very important role in the development and then the implementation of this ethics program. The compliance
officer appointed was, as he is today, a senior lawyer in the legal department.
In addition to reporting to the General Counsel, the compliance officer has
direct access to the Board of Directors through its Legal Affairs Committee.
How has the ITT program worked? Better and better over time, as the
management has gotten the message. "Getting the message" in effect meant
changing management attitudes, changing the corporate culture, if you will.
The issuance of a policy, even when the boss says at every management
meeting that he really means the policy to be carried out, sometimes doesn't
convince those who are determined to meet their company sales and revenue
goals by whatever means might be available.
Thus, shortly after the ITT Code of Conduct was promulgated throughout the system, the managing director of one of our major European
companies, a man who was my friend, called me aside at a meeting in
Brussels and said that he had been told he would have to make a substantial
payment to a government official if his company were to secure a very large
order on which the company had been working for a year. He asked me
whether the ITT policy against the making of such payments was for real.
When I assured him that it was, he said that this was such an important order
for his company that he said he couldn't believe that it would apply to this
kind of situation. The order was needed to make budget and he had to do
everything possible to meet that goal. His compensation, if not his job,
depended upon meeting the budget. I cautioned him that failure to abide by
the ITT policy would most certainly result in discharge. I urged him to talk
to the Chief Executive. He did, and later reported to me that he had been
told that if it took a bribe to get the order, the Chief Executive didn't want
it. The managing director said that he now realized that the boss really meant
it; there were no winks, no body language to convey another message.
But suppose that the European manager hadn't been convinced, had gone
ahead and authorized the bribe; suppose further that I found out, told the
Chief Executive and he was fired. My friend, the foreign national who ran
an ITT overseas subsidiary, had turned to me for advice and counsel in this

situation: he certainly acted as though he thought I was his lawyer. I am sure
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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that he would expect that if he got into trouble, I would be his advocate as
well. He certainly did not think, I can guarantee you, that I would be an
informer, a cop, or a prosecutor. Yet that is what I would have been
compelled to be because of my professional responsibility as lawyer to the
entity, were he to violate the company policy. Should I have given him a
warning of my primary role? I wonder had I done so whether he would have
talked to me about his problem. Remember the GE manager's unwritten
rule-never talk to the company lawyer.
Bartow Farr, then the General Counsel of the Singer Company, found
himself in a similar situation a dozen or so years ago according to a
contemporaneous report in an antitrust newsletter. Mr. Farr received
information suggesting that executives of one of the company's units had been
engaging in price fixing in violation of the antitrust laws. According to the
account, Mr. Farr dropped everything else and probed the informer's
suspicions. He was quoted as saying "I questioned all the people in top

positions in one day." Upon completing that effort, and securing admissions
from some, and denials from none, Mr. Farr told the Singer Chief Executive
of his findings. The next day Mr. Farr informed the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice, and Singer made a public disclosure in a news release.
There were ten utility customers affected by the price fixing, and they were
told that "Singer would make them whole."
It appears that those involved in the price fixing effort thought-however
misguidedly-that they were acting in the corporation's interests. Certainly,
there was no indication they were seeking to serve their own interests.
According to the media account of the incident, the executives involved were
given no advance word that the Singer General Counsel might turn over the
incriminating information to Justice. Mr. Farr was reported as saying "We
told them to get counsel after they told us they knew what we were talking
about." It would appear that Singer might have hoped to avoid indictment by
cooperating with the prosecutors. Singer officials said only that they believed
that what they did was the right thing to do.
There was a similar disclosure to law enforcement officials of information received from ITT executives in the course of an investigation by
corporate counsel of a violation of the Iranian embargo during the hostage
crisis. What happened was this: ITT Blackburn, a subsidiary of ITT based
in St. Louis, Missouri had shipped products to Iran in violation of a
Presidential Executive Order, employing the subterfuge of routing the
shipment through a customer in Finland who agreed to reship to Iran via the
Soviet Union. In this situation, the public disclosure was made by a would-be
blackmailer, a foreign national, who, acting as an independent sales
representative, had arranged this circuitous transaction. His demand for a
payoff to keep silent was rejected by ITT, and an internal investigation was
immediately commenced by the corporation's compliance officer, and as
indicated, it appeared that the charges had substance.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/4
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By law, ITT was required to report the violation of the Executive Order
to the Department of the Treasury, the branch of the Executive Department
charged with enforcement. In fact, the results of the in-depth investigation
of the blackmailer's charges, including the lawyer's report of interviews with
those responsible, were turned over to government enforcement officials.
The enforcement officials were also informed that there had been terminations
of those found to have wilfully violated the embargo.
While the corporation could have claimed the privilege recognized by the
Supreme Court's decision in the Upjohn case for the lawyer's report to top
management of the investigation, it was decided that it was not in the
corporation's best interests to do so. The possibility that those interviewed
might raise a claim of privilege, if provided the opportunity, was given only
passing consideration. Had the sentencing guidelines, to which I will refer
more extensively later, been in effect then, and assuming that there had
otherwise been in place a qualifying compliance program as described in
those guidelines, there would have been little choice. The need to disclose
the employees' wrongdoing as a means of mitigating the very heavy penalties
which otherwise would be imposed on the corporation as a result of their

wrongful acts would compel such action.
What was once a difficult decision for a general counsel to make, that
of waiving the corporation's privilege and seeking to gain the benefits of
cooperation with the authorities, is now the standard, as a result, first of the
voluntary adoption of the so called Defense Industry Initiatives, a multifaceted
compliance program proposed by the Packard Commission in 1987, and more
recently, the Sentencing Guidelines.
The Defense Industry Initiatives have a self-reporting requirement.
However, even before the adoption of these initiatives, crimes associated with
government procurement had been an exception to the normal practice of
defense attorneys of asserting the lawyer-client privilege and seeking
protection for work product. The reason is simple: for the corporation the
consequences of such a crime are not limited to pleading guilty and paying
a fine; the consequences include suspension of eligibility and ultimately
debarment from all future procurements. This could be a death sentence for
the firm. Even a temporary suspension can cause serious injury. Accordingly, when a problem arises and a company is suspended, its major efforts are
directed to establishing that it is a "responsible" contractor and securing relief
from the suspension or debarment order. Procurement agencies, particularly
the Department of Defense, routinely require, prior to such relief being
granted, that following a full investigation as to who was responsible, the
erring employees be terminated and the results of the investigation be
disclosed to the agency.
Under the more recently adopted sentencing guidelines for corporations,
a company can mitigate the very substantial penalties that are mandated for
corporate crimes by showing that it has an otherwise effective law compliance
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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program, which includes among its more significant elements: the adoption
and promulgation of a clear code of conduct; the carrying out of an
assessment of the company's operations to identify the risks that might lead
the corporation into law violation and the adoption of preventive programs,
including training at all levels of the organization regarding the corporate
code and law compliance; establishment of a compliance investigative
function, the swift imposition of discipline upon those found culpable; and,
most importantly, a commitment to inform law enforcement officials of law
violations discovered and to turn over investigative materials to those
enforcement authorities.
. Now, twenty years after the adoption of its code of conduct by ITT and
some other large companies, such corporate codes of conduct are the norm,
rather than the exception. In 1992 the Conference Board reported that a 1991
survey disclosed that over 82% of a representative sample of U.S. corporations had codes of conduct. It would seem that many, if not most, of these
codes were prompted by the need to be in a position to seek mitigation of
penalties under the sentencing guidelines.
Otto Obermaier, until recently the U.S. Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, recently said with respect to the Sentencing Guidelines:
"For the first time, corporations have been conscripted into the fight against
crimes. Good corporate citizenship is now defined by expanded obligations-the traditional prevention and detection of crime, and now the
reporting of crime when detected." These obligations fall almost entirely on
the shoulders of corporate counsel. Lawyers in the securities fields and
banking fields particularly are being challenged as the regulatory agencies
have sought to require disclosure by counsel to the regulatory agencies of
wrong-doing by their clients. I need only mention the proceedings by the

RTC against law firms that advised S&Ls and refer again to the SEC's
proceeding relating to the Salomon Brothers General Counsel.
There has been a good deal of discussion among corporate counsel as to
whether an employee should be given "Miranda" type warnings before being
questioned in an internal investigation, or if not that, be given an opportunity
to consult his or her own lawyer before submitting to interrogation. I have
concluded that carrying out my professional responsibility to the corporate
entity requires that neither of such courses be followed. It is my task to find
out what the facts are as fully and as quickly as possible. It is the obligation
of an employee to respond truthfully to questions put to him by the corporation as to activities in the course of his employment for which the corporation
may be held responsible, whether civilly or criminally.
It certainly appears to me to be inconsistent with the duties of an
employee to take the position that he will only respond after consultation with
an independent counsel. It is not that I fear that counsel will uniformly
advise his client to refuse to cooperate, although that does happen. However,
usually the prospect of immediate discharge for cause, ending all corporate
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/4
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support, including the advancement of legal fees, leads independent counsel
to refrain from advising "stonewalling" the internal investigation.
Rather, my main concern is that experienced outside counsel will point
out to his client that the only hope for mitigating personal criminal penalties
is through the culpable employee's cooperation with the prosecutor, that is,
making a deal to provide testimony implicating "higher ups." Regrettably,
human nature being what it is, it is predictable that the desire to avoid
criminal penalties by having something to give to the prosecutor will
frequently lead to "recollections" of alleged conversations with superiors that
would not have been "recollected" in the course of an inquiry by the

corporation's counsel carried out before the employee is given such advice.
So our internal investigations bear down on the issue of responsibility of
superiors early on, so as to pin down the facts.
So not only am I a cop, I am a tough cop. Having such a reputation

does, in fact, adversely impact my ability to establish good working
relationships with a certain segment of management that tends to believe that

getting ahead in business and corporate life requires cutting corners. It is a
challenge to balance the traditional roles of a lawyer as a counselor and
advocate with the newer roles of investigator, informer, and sometimes
prosecutor. But I submit that it is a challenge that corporate counsel must
meet appropriately in order to successfully carry out his or her professional
responsibility to the entity.
With apologies to T.S. Eliot, I would like to end these remarks with
more of a bang, rather than what might appear to be a whimper.
The enlargement of the role of corporate counsel, which I have described
in somewhat personal terms, is clearly good for the client, good for our
society and good for the lawyer. Corporate lawyers who know the business
of their company can identify areas of risk and provide advice that informs
management as to how to accomplish their goals in ways consistent with
legal, regulatory and ethical requirements. This is preventive law practice.
It is not just predicting the outcome of cases, but also anticipating the way in
which people will act in given circumstances and developing approaches that
help management to avoid legal pitfalls.
Protection of the corporation and its stockholders from the harsh impact
of criminal and civil penalties, public opprobrium, and loss of hard earned
reputations for integrity, which can result from wrongful management
conduct, is clearly a social benefit. This is particularly true as institutional
investors serving as intermediaries for pensioners and similar beneficiaries
own an ever increasing proportion of corporate America.
Of course, it is the obligation of all management levels and all management functions, not just the lawyers in the corporation, to be "keepers of the
corporate conscience." It is, however, the task of corporate lawyers to make
sure that management understands the full scope of this responsibility.
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Thus, lawyers employed by corporations are now called upon to take a
leadership role in bringing those business entities into the 21st century as
major participants in the drive to achieve a just society. As John Subak put
it: "As part of or advisor to management, the lawyer can be and is a
powerful force for ethical corporate conduct, not because he is a lawyer nor
because he knows best, but because the law so often embodies our society's
ethical judgments. By training, interest and background, a lawyer is more
often than not a thinking animal pretty well atuned to what is right and what
is wrong." 7 There is now a broader meaning to the status of lawyers as
"officers of the court," perhaps a more significant role than that which was
envisioned by the profession when I left law school over 40 years ago. To
all those of you who have the opportunity to serve in our country's corporations, I encourage you to take up this challenge.

7. John Subak, Special Problems of Inside Counsel 33 BUS. LAW. 1433, 1434
(1978).
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